Question: What Is The Difference Between Criminal Intimidation & Harassment?
Answer: Both Deal With Communications That Are Criminal, But They Differ On Intent. See Below.
Rakiea McCaskill had a relationship with Tamika Matlock’s (“Matlock”) husband (“Husband”), with whom she had a child. According to Matlock, Husband lied to McCaskill over the period of a year or 2 and told her that he was planning to leave Matlock, but he never did. Between the night of October 28, 2012 and the morning of October 29, 2012, when McCaskill’s child with Husband, McCaskill called Matlock 4 times and told her that she “would beat [her] ass” and that “she was coming over to [Matlock’s] house and [ ] had been sitting in front of [her] house.” McCaskill also contacted Matlock on Facebook, again telling her that she was going to “beat [her] ass” and that “everybody in the city [knew she would] beat [her] ass.” During one of McCaskill’s phone calls, Matlock responded, “You keep putting this stuff on Facebook then come to my house like you said.” During another call, McCaskill told Matlock that she was outside Matlock’s house, so Matlock looked out the window and saw McCaskill’s vehicle.
In December, 2012, the State charged McCaskill with misdemeanor intimidation under subsection (a)(1) of the intimidation statute. The charging information provided that McCaskill had communicated a threat to Matlock with the intent that she engage in conduct against her will, namely to “leave her husband and/or cause her husband to leave her.” The trial court held a bench trial, at which Matlock testified that “[McCaskill] kind of want[s] my husband to leave me….” When asked, though, whether McCaskill “specifically said she was going to beat [Matlock’s] ass because [she was] married to [Husband],” Matlock admitted that “[McCaskill] didn’t say why she would beat my ass.” Still, Matlock argued “[w]hy else would she want to beat my ass? I don’t talk to her. I’m not friends with her.” Subsequently, McCaskill testified and claimed that she had threatened Matlock because Matlock and Matlock’s cousin had previously “jumped on [her].” The trial court found McCaskill guilty of Class A misdemeanor intimidation and sentenced her to 365 days with 363 days suspended.
On appeal, McCaskill argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to convict her of intimidation. Pursuant to I.C. § 35–45–2–1(a), a person commits intimidation if that person “communicates a threat to another person, with the intent: (1) that the other person engage in conduct against the other person’s will; [or] (2) that the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act …” The State charged McCaskill with the intent to cause Matlock to engage in the conduct of leaving Husband against her will. McCaskill does not deny that she threatened Matlock. However, McCaskill argues that there was insufficient evidence of her intent because she never specified the reason for her threats towards Matlock. The Court of Appeals found that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that McCaskill committed intimidation as charged, and reversed that conviction. However, we note that the State also argued for the lesser-included offense of harassment at trial. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 35–45–2–2(a), a person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communication: (1) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues; (2) communicates with a person by telegraph, mail, or other form of written communication …commits harassment, a Class B misdemeanor.
In the instant case, McCaskill made several threats to Matlock through telephone and Facebook that she was going to “beat [her] ass” and that “everybody in the city [knew she would] beat [her] ass.” These statements were clearly intended to harass, annoy, or alarm Matlock and were not intended to result in legitimate communication. Additionally, McCaskill does not deny that she made these threats. As a result, we conclude that the State did produce sufficient evidence that McCaskill committed harassment. We remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate McCaskill’s judgment of conviction for intimidation and to enter a judgment of conviction for McCaskill for harassment. 3 N.E.3d 1047