Question: When Does The College Have Liability For Fraternity Hazing A Pledge?
Answer: Liability Would Depend On Control, See Below.
Plaintiff, Brian Yost, as an 18–year–old freshman at Wabash College and a pledge at the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity, suffered injuries in an incident at the fraternity house in 2007. Contending that his injuries resulted from a fraternity hazing incident, the plaintiff initiated this action seeking damages from Wabash College, the campus local fraternity, the national fraternity, and Nathan Cravens, one of the fraternity members. The college and the 2 fraternity defendants sought summary judgment, which the trial court granted and the plaintiff appealed.
Wabash College sought summary judgment, asserting: (a) it did not have a duty as a college or as a landlord to protect Yost from Cravens’ alleged negligence or criminal attack; (b) it is not subject to vicarious liability for the actions of any co-defendant; and (c) Yost’s claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law. In response, Yost explained his claims. First, he emphasized, “Landowner liability—not the doctrine of in loco parentis—governs this case.” Yost asserted that “as the lessor, Wabash had a duty to control the conduct of Phi Psi, and its members,” and that “as the landlord, Wabash had a duty to protect Yost… from reasonably foreseeable tortious and criminal activity. Second, Yost argued, “Aside from Wabash’s duty as the lessor of the property, Wabash… assumed a duty to protect Yost from this incident when it prohibited hazing and responded to the many previous incidents of hazing with disciplinary measures. Third, Yost claimed that Wabash is vicariously liable for the actions of Phi Psi’s members. Finally, Yost claimed, he is entitled to punitive damages from Wabash. Yost appears to assert a claim for punitive damages as a separate cause of action, but, while punitive damages has its own prerequisite elements of proof, such elements do not establish an independent cause of action. The prerequisite elements only define when punitive damages may be awarded as part of the damages to which a plaintiff may be entitled if successful under a recognized existing cause of action. We thus consider Yost’s claims against Wabash to present only three theories of liability: [a] negligence as owner and landlord of the local fraternity house by failing to protect Yost from the alleged negligent or criminal act of Cravens; [b] negligent breach of assumed duty “to supervise and regulate the activities and behavior of fraternities on its campus,” by failing to protect Yost from hazing; and [c] vicarious liability for the negligence of the local fraternity and its members.
Here, the materials designated on summary judgment provide evidence that Wabash engaged in educational outreach programs to encourage and enhance appropriate student behavior and to discourage hazing. But, the specific “undertaking” did not extend to direct oversight and control of the behavior of individual student members of the local fraternity. Yost does not predicate his claim on alleged negligence by Wabash in the formulation and dissemination of its educational material—the specific services arguably undertaken by Wabash, and for which liability may attach if negligently performed. Expressed another way, there is no direct evidence or reasonable inferences in this case to establish that Wabash deliberately and specifically undertook to control and protect Yost from the injuries he sustained or to generally prevent its students from engaging in injurious private conduct toward each other. Nor is there evidence that Yost in any way relied upon Wabash to take action in furtherance of the claimed gratuitously assumed duty. Wabash’s policies and investigations with respect to hazing do not rise to the level of a specific undertaking that demonstrate a special relationship between Yost and Wabash so as to justify the imposition upon Wabash of a gratuitously assumed duty to protect Yost from hazing. To the contrary, colleges and universities should be encouraged, not disincentivized, to undertake robust programs to discourage hazing and substance abuse. To judicially impose liability under a theory of gratuitously assumed duty is unwise policy and should be cautiously invoked only in extreme circumstances involving a negligently performed assumed undertaking—circumstances not here present.
The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that, because Wabash, as landlord, had relinquished control of the house to the local fraternity, because any duties assumed by Wabash did not extend to direct oversight and control of individual students living in the house, and because of the absence of any vicarious liability of Wabash arising from any agency relationship between Wabash and the local fraternity, Wabash is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. 3 N.E.3d 509