What can constitute battery in the State of Indiana:
In the State of Indiana, when a husband shoves his wife and pokes her in the forehead repeatedly, causing her pain, is that pain alone sufficient evidence to prove the “bodily injury” element of the husband’s conviction for domestic battery? The answer is, “yes”. See Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 2012).
In the Bailey case, a husband comes home from work and began drinking with his wife. Each consumed about three beers after which his wife states that he began threatening her, calling her vulgar names, and “putting his hands on [her].” He then poked her repeatedly in the forehead with his finger, hard enough to push her head back and cause her pain. After the police came to the residence on three occasions, the police arrested husband who had continued with the above conduct. The husband was charged with battery and domestic battery, both as class A misdemeanors. At trial, the judge found the husband guilty of domestic battery and sentenced him to two years in prison.
On Appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana’s domestic battery statute provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally touches an individual who … is or was a spouse of the other person … in a rude, insolent, or angry manner that results in bodily injury to the person … commits domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.” I.C. § 35–42–2–1.3(a)(1). The offense is elevated to a class D felony if the accused has a prior domestic battery conviction. I.C. § 35–42–2–1.3(b)(1). A lesser-included offense for domestic battery is simple battery, a class B misdemeanor which has only the elements that the accused “knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent or angry manner.” I.C. § 35–42–2–1(a). There is no bodily injury requirement for simple battery. Bodily injury, in turn, is defined by statute as “any impairment of physical condition, including physical pain.” I.C. § 35–31.5–2–29. From this one can see that, despite our prior cases all seeming to have higher levels of injury to the victims, the Court has never said a particular level of pain is required in order to rise to the level of impairment of physical condition and thus satisfy the definition of bodily injury. Rather, we think the proper reading of Indiana’s statute, and those cases, is that physical pain is an impairment of physical condition.
Thus, Indiana uses a similar two-tier grading structure for batteries that result in physical injury. The top tier is reserved for that extreme conduct falling within the statutory definition of serious bodily injury. See Ind.Code § 35–31.5–2–292 (2012) (“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes: (1) serious permanent disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4) permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ; or (5) loss of a fetus.”) and Ind.Code § 35–42–2–1(a)(3) (class C felony when battery results in serious bodily injury); see also Ind.Code § 35–42–2–1.5 (2008) (aggravated battery requires proof that person “knowingly or intentionally inflicts injury” creating “a substantial risk of death or caus [ing] (1) serious permanent disfigurement; (2) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ; or (3) the loss of a fetus”). Any other battery resulting in physical injury must fall into a lower tier that is necessarily much broader. This decision creates a logical and definable mechanism with which to apply the fact of a victim’s pain in the context of criminal charges that turn on the existence and severity of bodily injury.