In 2009, 16-year-old D.K. was asleep in her bed when she felt someone on top of her, beating and stabbing her on her head and upper body. As the attack progressed, D.K. was struck several times with a tire iron, was stabbed several times, lost consciousness three times, and urinated on herself. At some point, D.K. recognized that her attacker was Keiyun Mays, known to her because he had dated her sister. D.K. eventually escaped from Mays and obtained assistance. A jury found Mays guilty of Class B felony criminal confinement, and the trial court sentenced him to 15 years and found him to be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). On appeal, Mays claimed insufficient evidence to sustain an SVP finding.
Indiana Code section 35–38–1–7.5, which governs findings regarding sexually violent predators, provides, in part, that as used in this section, ‘sexually violent predator’ means a person who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to repeatedly commit a sex offense. In this case, the State sought to have Mays found an SVP pursuant to subsection (e), which provides, in part, that the prosecuting attorney may request the court to conduct a hearing to determine whether the person … is a sexually violent predator…. If the court grants the motion, the court shall appoint 2 psychologists or psychiatrists who have expertise in criminal behavioral disorders to evaluate the person and testify at the hearing. After conducting the hearing and considering the testimony of 2 psychologists or psychiatrists, the court shall determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator…. A hearing conducted under this subsection may be combined with the person’s sentencing hearing. When a defendant makes a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a trial court’s SVP finding, our inquiry is whether there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s finding that the defendant suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him or her likely to repeatedly commit the enumerated sex or violent offenses. We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.
In this case, Dr. Prasad opined that Mays suffered from “antisocial personality … also called psychopathic personality [disorder]” and that “there was a high likelihood that [Mays] might [reoffend in a sexual manner] if the circumstances presented themselves.” Dr. Rodos opined that Mays had “an antisocial personality disorder” characterized by “the inability … to feel guilty about what you do, to put consequences on what you do, and control what you do” and concluded that Mays was a SVP. It is worth noting that Mays told Dr. Prasad that he had intended to rape D.K. as revenge for previously refusing to have sex with him and admitted to Dr. Rodos that the motive for his crimes against D.K. was sexual. Although Dr. Parker opined that Mays did not meet the definition of an SVP, the trial court was under no obligation to credit his opinion. Moreover, we have previously held that unanimity between the doctors is not required for an SVP finding. Mays’s argument amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. The SVP procedure here was a post-conviction evaluation that did not produce any admissions that contributed to any criminal convictions, only, in this case, to the determination of Mays’s SVP status. Moreover, the crucial factor identified by the Gardner Court is also present here, as Mays was informed prior to trial that he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said he could be used against him. Finally, there is no indication of any coercion or force exerted by Drs. Prasad and Rodos (or any other person) during their interviews with Mays. Mays has failed to establish that the process used to determine his SVP status constituted fundamental error.