Why marijuana, cars and motorcycles do not mix well on Indiana roads?
On September 22, 2022, Shambreka Hall was involved in a traffic collision with Dale Womack. Womack died as a result of the injuries that he sustained in the collision. An investigating officer observed signs of impairment in Hall following the collision and her blood subsequently tested positive for THC and THC metabolites. Hall was charged with, and convicted of, Level 4 felony operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II substance in the blood causing death. Hall contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction. She alternatively contends that Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5 is unconstitutionally vague.
In September of 2022, Hall was employed delivering food through Door Dash in South Bend. The afternoon of September 22, 2022, Hall received a delivery request from a restaurant near 27th Street and Mishawaka Avenue. As Hall was driving on 31st Street toward Mishawaka Avenue, Hall stopped at the stop sign on 31st Street. Mishawaka Avenue had a speed limit of twenty miles per hour and cross traffic was required to stop. While at the stop sign, Hall’s view was partially obstructed. At the same time, Womack was leaving Dave’s Pub on Mishawaka Avenue. Womack, who was not wearing a helmet, had pulled away from the pub on his motorcycle and traveled approximately 270 feet, quickly accelerating to approximately 37 to 40 miles per hour.
On Appeal, Hall claims that because Indiana Code 9-30-5-5 contains a blanket prohibition against driving with a schedule I or II drug in a person’s blood and does not require an additional showing of impairment, the statute is unconstitutional as it is not rationally designed to prevent dangerous behavior when it punishes behavior that is not dangerous at all. The Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that a flat ban on driving with any proscribed controlled substance in the body, whether or not capable of causing impairment, is permissible. It is permissible because, unlike alcohol, there is no acceptable level of drug use that can be quantified so as to distinguish between users who can drive unimpaired and those who are presumptively impaired. Consequently, our legislature could have reasonably concluded that no level of schedule I or schedule II controlled substances can be acceptably combined with driving a vehicle. Thus, it is rational for the legislature to impose the flat ban with regard to controlled substances while not imposing the same ban with regard to alcohol. Thus, Hall’s argument was without merit.