Question: Do You Have To Stop When You Are Involved In An Accident?
Answer: Yes! Plus, You Can Go To Prison If You Don’t When Someone Is Seriously Injured!!
Around 7:00 p.m. on a rainy evening in 2013, Kathleen was walking along Meridian Street. Kathleen, a petite woman, was wearing dark clothing and carrying an umbrella. She was walking in the road because large bushes prevented her from walking next to it. Hudson, who was driving his pickup truck, struck Kathleen. The impact fractured Kathleen’s left leg and caused her head to rear back and strike the hood of Hudson’s truck. She died instantly. Eyewitnesses standing outside a nearby bar heard the impact and looked toward the sound. Hudson did not stop after the accident. He continued driving for half a mile, eventually turning into a residential neighborhood. A witness saw Hudson drive into the neighborhood noticing one of his headlights was out and watched as Hudson make a quick assessment, get into his truck and drive away. Hudson did not return to the scene of the accident or contact authorities. Kathleen’s body was found the following day 15 to 20 feet away from Meridian Street. Police found several of her possessions in and around the road. Several pieces of Hudson’s truck were also found nearby. Three days later, police received an anonymous tip that Hudson was involved in the accident. Hudson initially denied being in the area where the accident occurred and but when pressed, Hudson admitted that he was involved in the accident. He claimed he never saw Kathleen and did not know that he hit a person—he believed he struck a wooden barrier or sign. Hudson admitted that he stopped in a nearby neighborhood after the accident to inspect his truck and then continued home. He told police that he learned about Kathleen’s death on the news 2 days after the accident. The State charged Hudson with Class C felony failure to stop after an accident resulting in death. The trial court convicted Hudson and sentenced Hudson to 5 years—2 years home detention and 3 years suspended, two to probation.
On appeal, Hudson contends that the trial court applied Indiana Code section 9–26–1–1 over broadly. Specifically, he argues that the court was equivocal about the level of knowledge it believed Hudson had or legally should have had to kick in the duties under the statute. In fact, the trial court expressly found that Hudson knew that an accident with injury had occurred as required by Section 9–26–1–1.2. The question then becomes whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to support that finding. Indiana Code requires a driver involved in an accident that results in the injury or death of another person to stop, remain at the scene, and provide his name, address, and vehicle registration information. If the driver knowingly or intentionally fails to meet any of the requirements imposed by the statute, he commits a criminal offense. At the time Hudson committed the offense, if the accident resulted in the death of a person, the offense was a Class C felony. The purpose of the statute is to provide prompt aid for persons who are injured or whose property is damaged and to sufficiently establish the identity of the parties so that they and police authorities may know with whom to deal in matters growing out of the accident. This case turns on what Hudson knew about the accident in which Kathleen was killed. The trial court ultimately determined that Hudson knew that an accident with injury had occurred, and we agree. A driver’s knowledge of the fact that an accident with injury has occurred is a necessary element of the proof in a prosecution for failure to stop. Yet a driver need not have actual knowledge that an accident has resulted in an injury to be convicted under the statute. Where conditions were such that the driver should have known that an accident occurred or should have reasonably anticipated that the accident resulted in injury to a person, the requisite knowledge is present. When a driver prosecuted for failure to stop asserts that he did not know he was involved in an accident causing injury, that assertion is a defense that goes to the issue of whether he possessed the requisite mens rea, and the credibility of that defense is an issue for the fact finder. The trier of fact may infer a defendant’s knowledge from circumstantial evidence. Based on this and other evidence, the court found Hudson guilty of Class C felony failure to stop after an accident resulting in death. On appeal, we may not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses who provided it. We find the evidence sufficient to support Hudson’s conviction. 20 N.E.3d 900