Question: What Does It Take To Be Declared Incompetent To Stand Trial & Get Committed
Answer: 2 or 3 Disinterested Doctors, A Hearing And A Judicial Finding Of Incompetence!
In 2012, Leedy was driving about 80 miles per hour with his girlfriend on an Indianapolis street. His blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was .15, and he ran a red light, colliding with a pickup truck. Leedy’s girlfriend died shortly thereafter, and the driver of the truck suffered serious injuries. Leedy suffered a brain injury and was comatose for about a month. After the State charged him, Leedy filed a motion for competency and sanity evaluation to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. He underwent mental evaluations. The doctors submitted reports and both doctors testified at a hearing that Leedy could not understand the nature of the charges and proceedings against him and could not assist his counsel in conducting his defense. The doctors testified concerning Leedy’s need of physical and occupational therapy. They further testified concerning the various services available at the state psychiatric hospitals. After reviewing the medical evidence, the trial court determined that Leedy was incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Division of Mental Health and Addiction (DMHA).
On appeal, the Court noted that Involuntary commitment is a clear deprivation of a defendant’s liberty and can only be justified on the basis of legitimate state interests. The State has dual interests in committing an incompetent defendant: (1) to restore the accused to competency due to the right of the public and the defendant to the prompt disposition of criminal charges pending against him and (2) to protect the defendant against being required to answer to charges that [he] lacks the capacity to understand or to assist his attorney in defending against the charges. Leedy essentially argues that the law is unconstitutional as applied to him because it is specifically geared toward those with mental illness or disability and not to defendants who, like himself, are incompetent due to traumatic brain injury. At the outset, we note that there is nothing in the statutory language indicating such a distinction based on the source of a defendant’s incompetency. To the extent that the source of his incompetency may affect his statistical probability of restoration, it is relevant in making that determination.
Here, Leedy concedes that “there has not been a finding that [he] is not restorable. Rather, he asserts that he must get therapies DMHA cannot provide if there is to be any hope of restoration. With respect to the restoration issue, we note the following: (1) the trial court did not make any specific finding concerning Leedy’s chances at restoration; (2) the expert testimony presented at the competency hearing was conflicting concerning the probability of his restoration; (3) beyond the fact that there is no specific language in the statute distinguishing between the various sources of incompetency, i.e., mental illness versus traumatic brain injury, the experts’ testimony that the restoration success rate is statistically higher in mental illness patients did not preclude restoration in the cases involving traumatic brain injury; (4) because the trial court stayed its commitment order pending this interlocutory appeal, DMHA has not had Leedy in its care and custody, and as such, has not even had the statutory ninety days during which to evaluate his chances of restoration; and (5) the evidence was inconclusive regarding the effect of any DMHA funding constraints upon Leedy’s receipt of therapeutic services necessary to restore his competency. Simply put, Leedy’s due process arguments are based on speculation concerning both DMHA’s ability to provide him with the necessary therapeutic services and his own cognitive responses to those services. Essentially, he has asked us to reweigh evidence and make a conclusion that the legislature has specifically delegated to experts in the field of mental competency, a determination that is made after a period of providing services and evaluating the patient/accused. This is precisely why the General Assembly outlined such specific procedures, recognizing the delicate balance that exists between the fundamental fairness owed to the accused and the interests of both the public and the accused in the prompt disposition of criminal charges. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the commitment statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Leedy and that the trial court did not violate Leedy’s due process rights in ordering his commitment to DMHA. Accordingly, we affirm. 998 N.E.2d 307